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Restoring The Fourth Amendment:
The Original Understanding Revisited
by DAVID E. STEINBERG*
I. Introduction
Today, Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess.' Supreme Court
decisions are arbitrary, unpredictable, and often border on
incoherent.
Fourth Amendment scholars compete to develop catchy phrases
that describe this quagmire. Professor Craig Bradley writes: "The
fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby; a mass of
contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in
such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them
more profoundly stuck."2 According to Professor Erik Luna, each
new Fourth Amendment case "is more duct tape on the
Amendment's frame and a step closer to the junkyard."3 Professor
Akhil Amar simply writes: "The Fourth Amendment today is an
embarrassment. "4
This incoherence has resulted from attempts to apply the Fourth
Amendment in situations where the amendment never was intended
"Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. B.A., Northwestern University, 1982;
J.D., Stanford Law School, 1986.
I have learned a great deal about Fourth Amendment history from the landmark works of William
Cuddihy and Thomas Davies. See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and
Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School); Thomas
Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547 (1999). I am
indebted to these fine scholars. Thanks to Elizabeth Koren and Chelsea Newby for their helpful
research assistance on this article.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects .... ).
2. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468
(1985).
3. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 787-88 (1999).
4. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles].
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to apply. The framers intended that the Fourth Amendment only
would regulate searches of residences. The Fourth Amendment
prohibited house searches pursuant to a general warrant, as well as
warrantless house searches If one asked the framers what the
amendment provided with respect to other types of government
searches or seizures, the answer would be: "Nothing at all."6
Part II of this article reviews three areas of modern Fourth
Amendment law - container searches, random drug tests, and auto
checkpoints. The law in these areas is arbitrary and unpredictable.
As a result, police officers may violate the Fourth Amendment simply
because they cannot understand Fourth Amendment law. When
courts exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, this doctrinal unpredictability results in high social
costs.
Part III of this essay reviews historical evidence on the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. To a remarkable degree,
framing era discussions of unreasonable searches and seizures all
focused on a single, discrete problem - unlawful searches of
residences. The modern assumption that the Fourth Amendment
applies outside of house searches receives little if any historical
support.
Part IV of this essay discusses why Fourth Amendment history
matters. Given the lack of any modern consensus defining the term
"unreasonable searches and seizures," a non-originalist Fourth
Amendment interpretation ultimately will be arbitrary and subjective
5. I have developed this historical thesis in several articles. See David E. Steinberg, An
Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
227 (2005) [hereinafter Steinberg, Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History]; David E.
Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV.
1051 (2004) [hereinafter Steinberg, The Original Understanding]; David E. Steinberg, High
School Drug Testing and the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 263 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg, High School Drug Testing].
6. My view of the Fourth Amendment today is profoundly different from the positions that I
expressed in some earlier writings on the amendment. In those pieces, I argued that the warrant
requirement should apply to a variety of searches that did not involve any physical entry into a
residence. See David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward Warrantless Auto Searches: Suggestions
From a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REV. 545, 546 (2000) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg, The
Drive Toward Warrantless Auto Searches] (asserting that the Supreme Court's "abandonment of
the warrant requirement for automobile searches is ill-advised"); David E. Steinberg, Making
Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563, 613-27 (1990) [hereinafter cited as
Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches] (suggesting a new approach for applying
the warrant requirement to sense-enhanced searches, which usually do not involve a physical
entry into a residence). My change in thinking has resulted both from my more complete
understanding of Fourth Amendment history, and my profound doubts about the viability of
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
[Vol. 33:1
RESTORING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
- as illustrated by modern Fourth Amendment doctrine. Part IV
demonstrates this subjectivity by examining results of the modern
"reasonable expectation of privacy test," used to determine if the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies. Originalist
evidence on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is relevant,
precisely because there is no coherent alternative.
Part V of this essay briefly examines possible restraints on police
officers in a world without a Fourth Amendment. Such restraints
could include police department rule-making, statutory regulations,
and tort suits seeking civil damages. Critics may contend that these
alternatives will not impose adequate restraints on police officers.
But relying on the Fourth Amendment as a general regulation of
police searches and seizures simply is unworkable. The Fourth
Amendment never was intended to serve this role.
II. The Doctrinal Morass
The following section examines Supreme Court doctrine that
governs three areas of Fourth Amendment law - container searches,
random drug tests, and auto checkpoints. This review is sobering.
These Fourth Amendment decisions seem both arbitrary and
unpredictable.
The section concludes by noting the high social costs that occur
when this doctrinal incoherence is combined with the exclusionary
rule. Police officers violate the Fourth Amendment because the
officers can't understand the law. As a result of these violations,
evidence is excluded and guilty criminals go free.
A. Container Searches.
A container "denotes any object capable of holding another
object."7 Common examples of containers include luggage,8 purses,9
and brown paper bags.'0
7. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1977) (a warrantless search of a
footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment).
9. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-307 (1999) (where police officers
found a passenger's purse in a car, a warrantless search of the purse did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
10. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-81 (1991) (where police officers
found a brown paper bag in a car, a warrantless search of the bag did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-25 (1982) (where a police officer had
probable cause to believe that an automobile contained narcotics, the officer could open a paper
bag in the trunk of the car without first obtaining a warrant).
FALL 20051
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The general Fourth Amendment rule that applies to containers is
stated in United States v. Chadwick." The Chadwick Court concluded
that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed
containers. Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote that like a person
"who locks the doors of his home against intruders," a person who
places his possessions in a locked footlocker "is due the protection of
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. ' 2 The Chadwick decision
thus announced the following rule: police officers may seize a
container with probable cause, but the officers cannot open the
container until they obtain a warrant.13
However, police officers do not need a warrant to search one
type of large, common container - the automobile." The Supreme
Court has justified warrantless searches of automobiles for three
reasons: 1) cars are inherently mobile,'5 2) there is extensive
regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, 6 and 3) people possess a
limited expectation of privacy in an auto that "travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view .
,,17
Cases where police officers have found containers inside of cars
have posed special problems. 8 In Arkansas v. Sanders,'9 the Supreme
Court initially held that police officers violated the Fourth
11. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id at 13-16.
14. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-95 (1985) (holding that a warrantless
search of a parked motor home did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (holding that police officers who possess probable may conduct a
warrantless search of an auto stopped on a highway, because "the car is movable, the occupants
are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained").
15. See, e.g., Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48-54 (upholding the warrantless search of an
automobile); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (same).
16. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (observing that extensive regulation
leads to greater "police-citizen contact involving automobiles" than "police-citizen contact in a
home or office").
17. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). See also Steinberg, The
Drive Toward Warrantless Auto Searches, supra note 6, at 547-50 (discussing the rationales cited
in support of warrantless automobile searches).
18. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Court's 'Two Models' Approach to the Fourth
Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 438-40 (1993) (discussing and
critiquing the Supreme Court's treatment of containers in cars); James J. Tomkovicz, California
v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1176
(1992) ("For warrant rule purposes, there is no sound reason to treat containers that happen to be
inside vehicles differently from containers found elsewhere.").
19. 442 U.S. 753 (1979), reversed by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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Amendment, where the officers opened a suitcase in a taxicab trunk
without first obtaining a warrant." However, Sanders ultimately was
reversed by California v. Acevedo.2 In Acevedo, Justice Harry
Blackmun wrote for the majority: "We conclude that it is better to
adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate
the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.
22
However, the Court has not adopted one clear-cut rule for
containers found in cars. Where police officers have probable cause
to believe that incriminating evidence is located somewhere in a car,
but the officers are unsure of where the evidence is concealed, the
officers may conduct a warrantless search of "every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."23
This rule "applies equally to all containers" found in a car, as well as
to the car itself.
24
On the other hand, police officers may have probable cause to
believe that evidence of crime is located in a particular container,
which happens to be stored in an auto.25 If so, police officers may
conduct a search of the suspicious container, but "a search of the
entire vehicle" would be "without probable cause" under the Fourth
Amendment - and thus unlawful.26
In short, the Court has endorsed a distinction with respect to
containers in cars. Where police officers have probable cause to
believe that evidence is located somewhere in the car, the officers
may search the entire car and open any containers." However, where
police officers have probable cause to believe that a particular
container in a car holds the evidence, police officers may open that
container, but cannot search the rest of the car' The fine distinction
between "probable-cause-with-respect-to-the-car" and "probable-
cause-with-respect-to-a-container-in-the-car" is sure to invite
litigation, unintentional Fourth Amendment violations, and exclusion
20. Id. at 763 ("[T]he State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need for
warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles.").
21. 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) (reversing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)).
22. Id.
23. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
24. Id. at 822.
25. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). In Acevedo, police officers had probable
cause to believe that a paper bag contained marijuana. Id. at 567. Police officers saw Charles
Steven Acevedo place the suspicious bag in the trunk of Acevedo's car. Id.
26. Id. at 580.
27. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822.
28. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
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of probative evidence.
The different treatment of containers-inside-of-cars and
containers-outside-of-cars raises even more serious Fourth
Amendment anomalies. Consider the following hypothetical, based
on Justice Blackmun's dissent in Chadwick.29 Police officers have
probable cause to believe that a train is a carrying a footlocker,
loaded with marijuana. The defendants claim the footlocker at a
Boston train station, and sit down on top of the footlocker.' The
defendants then leave the footlocker on the floor of the station, while
they look for an attendant to help move the heavy footlocker. 3' The
defendants eventually find an attendant, who loads the footlocker
into a co-defendant's automobile.32
If federal agents arrested the defendants while they were sitting
on the footlocker, the agents could conduct a warrantless search of
the footlocker. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine,33 law
enforcement officers who lawfully arrest a suspect may conduct a
warrantless search of any containers within the suspect's immediate
control. 34 Because the footlocker was within the suspects' immediate
control while they were sitting on it, a lawful arrest at this time would
have permitted the federal agents to conduct a warrantless search of
the footlocker.
Alternatively, federal agents might have waited until the
footlocker was stored in the auto. If the agents seized the footlocker
after it came to rest in the automobile, the automobile exception
would authorize a warrantless search of this container.35
But now assume that federal agents seized the footlocker after
the suspects had left to look for help, but before the footlocker was
loaded into the car. Assume further that the agents searched the
footlocker without a warrant. According to Chadwick, this
29. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that a warrantless search was
unlawful, where police officers searched areas of an arrested suspect's house that were not within
the suspect's immediate control).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-37 (1973) (when a police officer
arrested a suspect, the officer may open a cigarette package in the suspect's coat without
obtaining a warrant).
35. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572-81 (where police officers had probable cause to believe that
a brown paper in the trunk of an automobile contained marijuana, the officers could open the
paper bag).
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warrantless search of the footlocker would violate the Fourth
Amendment.36
As Justice Blackmun described these results in his Chadwick
dissent: "The approach taken by the Court has the perverse result of
allowing fortuitous circumstances to control the outcome of the
present case. 37 In other words, to make the lawfulness of a search
turn on such trivial timing issues is absurd.
Dissenting in Acevedo," Justice John Paul Stevens identifies a
similar Fourth Amendment "paradox."39  A suspect is carrying a
heavy briefcase. Police officers have probable cause to believe that
the briefcase is filled with marijuana. Indeed, the briefcase does
contain this illicit drug. However, the police officers have not
obtained a search warrant for the briefcase. The suspect hails a cab.
The cab driver agrees to load the briefcase in the trunk. The suspect
then enters the cab, leaving the briefcase on the sidewalk. The cab
driver puts the briefcase in the trunk of the cab, shuts the trunk, and
drives away.
Assume that the police officers seize the briefcase while it sits on
the sidewalk. If the officers search the briefcase without a warrant,
the Chadwick rule governing container searches applies. The
warrantless search of the briefcase is unlawful, and any evidence
found inside almost certainly will be excluded at a criminal trial."
However, what if the officers wait until the briefcase is in the
36. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-16. In Chadwick, federal agents actually seized the footlocker
just after the defendants had loaded the container into the trunk of Chadwick's car. Id. at 4.
However, the Chadwick Court concluded that the automobile search doctrine did not apply,
because the footlocker had only a "brief contact with Chadwick's car." Id. at 11.
I never have understood why the automobile search doctrine did not apply in Chadwick.
Most automobile search cases do not consider how long a container has rested in an automobile.
Instead, courts often have upheld warrantless automobile searches after a container has spent just
a few minutes inside of a car. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572-81 (a warrantless search of a
brown paper bag was lawful, when the defendant had placed the paper bag in the trunk of his car
just a few moments before police officers stopped the car, opened the trunk, and searched the
paper bag). Based on the reasoning that appears in decisions such as Acevedo, the Chadwick
Court should have treated the search of the footlocker as an automobile search case.
37. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 598.
40. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-16. If the suspect were carrying the briefcase, police officers
could arrest the suspect and then search the briefcase without a warrant. Under the search
incident to arrest doctrine, police officers may conduct a warrantless search of any container
within a suspect's immediate control, at the time when the suspect is lawfully arrested. See, e.g.,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-37 (1973) (upholding a warrantless search of a
cigarette package in a suspect's coat, which occurred during a lawful arrest).
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trunk of the taxi? Now that the auto search doctrine applies, the
warrantless search is permissible.41 Justice Stevens had the following
reaction to these results: "[S]urely it is anomalous to prohibit a search
of a briefcase while the owner is carrying it exposed on a public street
yet to permit a search once the owner has placed the briefcase in the
locked trunk of his car.
42
These bizarre results are the work of the nation's best and
brightest legal talent. Supreme Court Justices are carefully selected,
and subjected to a rigorous confirmation process.4 '3  The Court's
jurisdiction is almost entirely discretionary, with the Justices handling
a relatively limited docket.' Each Justice has the assistance of several
law clerks, whom the Justices choose from the best and brightest law
school graduates.4 As is the case with the doctrines discussed below,
the bizarre results in the container search cases suggest that
something is terribly wrong with the way that we currently think
about the Fourth Amendment.
B. Random Drug Tests
Since 1989,46 the Supreme Court has reviewed six random drug
test cases. The Court has upheld four random drug test programs,
while concluding that two other programs violated the Fourth
41. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-307 (1999) (where a highway patrol
officer found a passenger's purse in an auto, the officer could search the purse without a warrant);
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572-81 (police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment, where the
officers conducted a warrantless search of a brown paper bag located in the trunk of an
automobile).
42. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. For discussions of the modem Supreme Court confirmation process, see Henry P.
Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203-12
(1988); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices in the Modern
Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 562-86 (1988); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1494-1520 (1992).
44. See, e.g., LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT
SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (New York: New York
University Press, 2001) (reporting that the Supreme Court agrees to review only about one
percent of the cases that reach the Court through a petition for certiorari).
45. See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Gender Discrimination in the Supreme Court's Clerkship
Selection Process, 75 OR. L. REV. 359, 362 (1996) (former Supreme Court clerks "practice in the
nation's best law firms, teach in its best law schools, hold the plum public-sector appointments,
and on occasion rise again to the Supreme Court").
46. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-79 (1989)
(upholding random drug tests for some customs service employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor




In distinguishing between permissible and impermissible random
drug test programs, the Court has emphasized two factors. First, the
Justices often have upheld random drug tests only after the
government has demonstrated that the tests serve "special needs.
48
Second, the Justices have not permitted the use of random drug test
results in criminal prosecutions. 9
As in most areas of Fourth Amendment law, the Court's random
drug tests decisions seem unpredictable and difficult to reconcile. In
Chandler v. Miller," the Justices struck down a Georgia statute, which
required that candidates for designated state offices must take a
urinalysis drug test prior to their nomination or election. However, in
Board of Education v. Earls,1 the Justices upheld a random urinalysis
test policy for high school students who participated in competitive
extracurricular activities. 2
The holdings in Earls and Chandler are difficult to reconcile. In
Chandler, the Court emphasized that the state had not produced any
"concrete danger" of widespread illicit drug use among candidates for
public office. 3 But such evidence also was lacking with respect to the
particular students tested in Earls.4
47. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-38 (2002) (upholding random drug tests of
all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-64 (1995) (upholding random drug tests of students who participated in
interscholastic athletics); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-79 (upholding random drug tests of some
customs service employees); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-34 (upholding random drug tests of railway
workers). But cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76-85 (2001) (a random drug
testing program for women who received pre-natal care violated the Fourth Amendment);
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-23 (1997) (random drug testing of candidates for state
office violated the Fourth Amendment).
For discussions of random drug testing cases, see Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School
Drug Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 349 (1996); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe,
Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant
Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997).
48. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
49. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80 (a random drug testing program for women receiving
prenatal care violated the Fourth Amendment, where law enforcement authorities could receive
positive drug test results).
50. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
51. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
52. Id. at 826.
53. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-19.
54. Earls, 536 U.S. at 835 (the state school board failed to demonstrate any "particularized or
pervasive drug problem" among Tecumseh High School students involved in extracurricular
activities. See also id at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Nationwide, students who participate in
extracurricular activities are significantly less likely to develop substance abuse problems than are
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In fact, random drug testing of candidates for public office would
seem to serve a more compelling interest than testing high school
students who participate in extracurricular activities, other than
athletic competitions.55 If certain members of the school orchestra or
chess club were under the influence of illicit drugs, those students
presumably would not pose a danger to anyone but themselves. 6
Conversely, if high-ranking state officials were under the influence of
illegal drugs, the officials could make decisions resulting in
considerable harm to the public.57 In short, the Court's random drug
test decisions in Chandler and Earls are difficult to reconcile.
C. Automobile Checkpoints
In three relatively recent decisions, the Supreme Court has
applied the Fourth Amendment to automobile checkpoints where
police officers stop each driver. As is the case in the container search
cases and the random drug test cases, these checkpoint decisions
seem arbitrary and unpredictable.58 The Supreme Court issued these
auto checkpoint decisions in the last 15 years. The incoherence of
this relatively new branch of Fourth Amendment law is particularly
troubling.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,59 the Supreme
Court upheld a Michigan sobriety checkpoint. Michigan state law
enforcement officers stopped every vehicle that passed through a
fixed checkpoint. At the checkpoint, the officers checked each driver
for obvious signs of intoxication. 6°
their less-involved peers.").
55. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). The Supreme Court upheld a
random drug testing program for high school students who participated in interscholastic
athletics. Id. at 665. The Acton majority observed that when student athletes use illegal drugs,
"the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport
is particularly high." Id. at 662.
56. Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he great majority of students that
the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in activities that are not safety sensitive to an
unusual degree.").
57. But cf Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22 (state officials "typically do not perform high-risk,
safety sensitive tasks").
58. For discussions of the Court's automobile checkpoint decisions, see Suzanne Graves,
Note, Checkpoints and the Fourth Amendment: Saving Grace or Constitutional Martyr?, 32
CoNN. L. REv. 1487, 1513-14 (2000); Doug Reeder, Note, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: The
Supreme Court Takes a Detour to Avoid Roadblock Precedent, 40 HOUS. L. REv. 577 (2003);
Shannon S. Schultz, Note, Edmond v. Goldsmith: Are Roadblocks Used to Catch Drug Offenders
Constitutional?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 571 (2000).
59. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
60. On average, each checkpoint stop lasted for about 25 seconds. Id. at 448. See also
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The Sitz Court held that the Michigan sobriety checkpoint
program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist balanced "the magnitude of the drunken
driving problem," and the state's "interest in eradicating it"" against
the minimal intrusion on motorists' privacy.62
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,3 the Court reviewed a
narcotics checkpoint program with many similarities to the
checkpoint program upheld in Sitz. In Edmond, police officers
stopped a predetermined number of vehicles at each checkpoint
location. While checking each driver for signs of impairment, the
police officers led a drug-detecting dog around the outside of each
stopped vehicle. 6'
The checkpoint in Edmond seemed identical to the Sitz sobriety
checkpoint, except that a drug-detecting dog sniffed the cars in
Edmond. But in United States v. Place,5 the Court had held that the
use of a drug-detecting dog was not a search, and was not covered by
the Fourth Amendment.66 So the Edmond checkpoint would seem to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
But it didn't. The Edmond Court held that the Indianapolis
narcotics checkpoints resulted out of an improper "primary
purpose., 67  According to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Sitz
checkpoint was designed primarily in response to "the necessity of
ensuring roadway safety., 68 However, in Edmond, "the Indianapolis
checkpoint program unquestionably has the primary purpose of
interdicting illegal narcotics. ' 69 The use of a checkpoint designed
primarily to serve criminal law enforcement interests was improper. °
If Sitz and Edmond were not confusing enough, the Court
further muddied the checkpoint waters in Illinois v. Lidster.1 Shortly
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-67 (1976) (where the Border Patrol stopped
cars briefly at a fixed checkpoint to search for illegal aliens, the checkpoint did not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
61. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
62. Id. ("the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at a sobriety checkpoint.., is slight").
63. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
64. Id. at 34-35.
65. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
66. Id. at 707.
67. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
68. Id. at 43.
69. Id at 40.
70. Id. at 44.
71. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
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after a bicyclist was killed in a hit-and-run accident on an Illinois
highway, police officers erected a highway checkpoint "at about the
same time of night and at about the same place" as the location where
the accident had occurred.72 During a brief stop, police officers asked
the occupants of each auto if they possessed any information about
the fatal hit-and-run accident.73
Robert Lidster was driving his minivan erratically as he
approached the checkpoint. Lidster was arrested, and eventually
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol."
The Lidster checkpoint was "designed primarily to serve the
general interest in crime control."7 Consequently, if one were to
adopt the reasoning in Edmond, this checkpoint would be unlawful.
Wrong again! The Lidster Court upheld the crime scene
checkpoint. Although the Lidster checkpoint furthered the state's
"general interest in crime control, 76 the checkpoint merely involved
an "information-seeking kind of stop. '77 Writing for the Lidster
majority, Justice Stephen Breyer observed: "The stop's primary law
enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's
occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as
members of the public, for their help in providing information about a
crime in all likelihood committed by others.,
78
The Court's attempts to distinguish the constitutional
checkpoints in Sitz and Lidster from the unconstitutional checkpoint
in Edmond are unconvincing. All three checkpoints were designed to
serve a "law enforcement purpose., 79 After all, each checkpoint case
came to the Supreme Court as a result of a criminal prosecution and a
conviction.
The argument that the police officers in Lidster were involved
only in an information-gathering foray is disingenuous. Had these
police officers stopped the hit-and-run driver at the Illinois
checkpoint, the officers unquestionably would have detained the
driver. Indeed, after Lidster was stopped, the state prosecuted him
for drunk driving.
72. Id. at 422.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
76. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 423.
79. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
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At least in Lidster, the Justices candidly admitted that the Court
would assess each checkpoint's "reasonableness, hence its
constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances. "o The
vagueness of this non-standard provides virtually no guidance to
police departments on lawful and unlawful checkpoints. Future
checkpoints seem certain to result in constitutional violations by
conscientious police departments, exclusion of probative evidence,
and questions about the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment interpretations.
D. Why It Matters: The Exclusionary Rule
A perfectly reasonable response to this doctrinal jumble is: "So
what?" The complexities of Fourth Amendment doctrine provide me
with a Criminal Procedure course to teach each year. And the Fourth
Amendment also is an endless source for bar examination questions.
But such Fourth Amendment doctrinal incoherence imposes
high social costs because of the exclusionary rule. Under this rule,
physical evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
usually is inadmissible at trial.8' Because such physical evidence is
frequently highly probative, application of the exclusionary rule often
means that the state cannot successfully prosecute guilty defendants,
who go free.
80. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426. The Court's distinction between the valid sobriety checkpoint in
Sitz and the invalid narcotics checkpoint in Edmond suggests a highly questionable balancing of
private and public interests. In Sitz, during a sobriety checkpoint established for 75 minutes,
police officers arrested about 1.6 percent of the drivers they stopped. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448. In
Edmond, during six narcotics checkpoints, about 9 percent of the auto stops resulted in arrests.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-35. The higher success rate suggests that the invalid Edmond checkpoint
served more compelling state interests than the valid Sitz checkpoint.
81. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule
applies in state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the
exclusionary rule applies in federal court cases).
The Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in some
circumstances, even where police officers have obtained evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that courts should not exclude evidence, "when an
officer acting with objective good faith" relies on a valid search warrant. See, e.g., United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980)
(illegally obtained evidence could be used to impeach a defendant's credibility on cross-
examination, where the questions had been suggested by the direct examination).
82. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254-55 (1983) (noting that because of "the
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence and the resulting social costs from its loss
through suppression, application of the exclusionary rule has been restricted"); Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, supra note 4, at 799 (as a result of the exclusionary rule, the Fourth
Amendment "has lost its luster and become associated with grinning criminals getting off on
crummy technicalities").
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The arbitrariness, unpredictability, and at times, incoherence of
Fourth Amendment law virtually ensure that police officers will
violate the Fourth Amendment, and evidence will be excluded.
Consider the facts of Kyllo v. United States.83 While sitting in a car
parked in a public street, federal agents used a thermal imaging unit
to measure the temperature inside of Danny Kyllo's garage. 8, The
agents did not obtain a search warrant prior to using this unit.
The thermal imaging unit showed that Kyllo's garage was
unusually warm. This finding supported the agents' suspicions that
Kyllo was using his garage as a marijuana greenhouse."
The agents' suspicions were justified. A subsequent search of
Kyllo's residence revealed more than 100 marijuana plants.86 Kyllo
predictably sought to suppress the evidence about the marijuana
plants, arguing that the warrantless use of the thermal imaging unit
had violated the Fourth Amendment."
Assume that prior to the decision in Kyllo, 8 the federal agents
had asked me whether the warrantless use of the thermal imaging
unit was constitutional. I would have speculated that the agents
probably could use the unit without first obtaining a warrant.89 In
California v. Ciraolo,90 the Supreme Court already had held that
police officers need not obtain a warrant before using an airplane to
peer into a suspect's backyard. 9 Both the aerial surveillance and the
use of the thermal imaging unit had occurred without any physical
trespass into the suspect's home.9 Before the Kyllo decision, I
83. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
84. Id. at 29-30.
85. See id. at 30 ("The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of
petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer
than neighboring homes in the triplex.").
86. Id. at 30.
87. Id. at 30-31.
88. Id.
89. Given the unpredictable quality of Fourth Amendment decisions, I strongly would have
encouraged the agents to obtain a warrant, if possible. Under the Fourth Amendment, police
officers may obtain a warrant only if the officers have established probable cause. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
90. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
91. Id. at 211-15.
92. Kyllo's argument that warrantless use of the thermal imaging unit violated the Fourth
Amendment received the strongest support from United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Karo held that warrantless monitoring of a beeper violated the Fourth Amendment, where the
beeper had entered a residence. Id at 716-18. However, unlike the thermal imaging unit in
Kyllo, the beeper in Karo actually was present within the four walls of the residence.
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reasoned that if warrantless aerial surveillance of a residential
backyard was constitutional, then warrantless use of the thermal
imaging unit outside of a residence also must be constitutional.
I was wrong. By a slim 5-4 majority, the Kyllo Court held that
the warrantless use of the thermal imaging unit violated the Fourth
Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
worried that a thermal imaging unit could provide law enforcement
officers with intimate details of a homeowner's activities. 9
As a result of the Fourth Amendment violation, the trial court
excluded evidence of the marijuana plants found in Kyllo's garage.
Without this physical evidence, the government typically could not
convict a marijuana farmer such as Kyllo.
Some commentators have lauded the Kyllo decision as a victory
for individual liberty and freedom.94 But for anyone who cares about
justice and equal treatment, Kyllo is an embarrassment. Danny Kyllo
was a marijuana farmer, just as culpable as any other marijuana
farmer with 100 plants. Yet while most marijuana farmers go to jail,
Kyllo might never serve jail time because police officers violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Whatever the propriety of suppressing evidence when law
enforcement officers act in bad faith, it is hard to think of Kyllo as a
case of bad faith by federal agents.9 I've been writing about the
Fourth Amendment since 1989,96 and I didn't think that the agents in
Kyllo needed a warrant. If I don't understand when the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant, I'm not certain how federal agents
and police officers are supposed to get it right.
This is the ultimate problem with an unpredictable and arbitrary
body of Fourth Amendment law, where violations of the amendment
are enforced through an exclusionary rule remedy. Inevitably, police
93. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (asserting that a thermal imaging unit "might disclose, for example,
at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath").
94. See, e.g., David Cole, Scalia's Kind of Privacy, THE NATION, July 23, 2001, at 6 (the
Kyllo decision involved "a rare instance of an alliance between liberals and libertarians, united
here in support of the sanctity of the home"); Jeffrey W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United
States, A Temporary Reprieve From Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 NC. L.
REV. 728, 757 (2003) ("Kyllo has been hailed as a landmark case that will stand along with the
Warren Court's decision in Katz.").
95. The Supreme Court has held that courts should not exclude evidence, "when an officer
acting with objective good faith" relies on an invalid search warrant. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 920 (1984). The good faith exception currently applies only to searches conducted
pursuant to an invalid warrant. The Court has not developed a similar good faith exception for
warrantless searches.
96. See Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, supra note 6.
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officers will misinterpret unpredictable Fourth Amendment doctrine,
courts will exclude evidence, and guilty criminals will go free. In the
end, society pays a high price for the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment incoherence.
HI. The Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment
A. House Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Historical Record
As Thomas Davies accurately observes, framing era discussions
"were almost exclusively about the need to ban house searches under
general warrants."' After a careful review of history, the emphasis
on house searches becomes apparent. In short, the framers enacted
the Fourth Amendment only to proscribe house searches pursuant to
a general warrant, or no warrant at all. When they enacted the
Fourth Amendment, the framers did not intend to regulate other
types of searches and seizures.
As William Cuddihy observes, the doctrine of unreasonable
searches and seizures originated as early as seventh-century
England 8 The early English codes "penalized severely those who
invaded a neighbor's premises or provoked a disturbance within it."99
These English housebreaking laws "sought to control violence by
private persons toward each other, not official searches by the
government. '"'1°
With the increased frequency of government house searches
after 1485, English thought began to postulate that certain types of
house searches by government agents were unreasonable and
unlawful. As Cuddihy summarizes this movement: "Elizabethan
Englishmen began to insist that their houses were castles for the
paradoxical reason that the castle-like security that those houses had
afforded from intrusion was vanishing. As the violence and
frequency of searches escalated, the perception that some types of
search and seizure were unreasonable appeared."'0 ' From the
beginning, the doctrine of unreasonable searches and seizures focused
on house searches, and not other types of government conduct.
97. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
551 (1999).
98. William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Understanding 32
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).
99. Id
100. Id at 36.
101. Id. at 128.
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The focus on unlawful house searches was reflected in framing
era controversies, which ultimately resulted in the Fourth
Amendment. Commentators have observed that discussion of
unreasonable searches in the late eighteenth century primarily
focused on three controversies - the John Wilkes cases in England,
Paxton's case in Boston, and American reactions to the Townshend
Act.1" In all three controversies, criticisms of the English government
focused almost exclusively on physical searches of houses pursuant to
general warrants.
In the eighteenth century, the most well-known examples of
unreasonable searches arose out of an English seditious libel
prosecution, brought against opposition politician John Wilkes and
his supporters. °3 In April 1763, an anonymous letter printed in an
opposition periodical described the British Tory administration as
"wretched" puppets, and "the tools of corruption and despotism.""
Based on a single general warrant issued by the Tory Secretary of
State, English officers searched at least five houses and arrested at
least 49 people. Wilkes and his supporters responded with at least
thirty different trespass and false imprisonment suits.'
16
In a series of decisions issued between 1763 and 1769, English
courts concluded that the house searches in the John Wilkes cases
violated English common law principles. 1  The officers who
conducted these house searches were liable for trespass and false
imprisonment." 8
The decisions in the John Wilkes cases heavily emphasized the
impropriety of house searches pursuant to the general warrant. For
102. See, e.g., NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 43-48 (1937) (discussing the John Wilkes cases); id. at 57-63 (discussing Paxton's
case); id at 69-76 (discussing the Townshend Act). See also Davies, supra note 97, at 561-67
(discussing these three controversies and noting agreement among commentators that these
controversies represent the most important events leading to the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment).




107. The published opinions that arose out of suits initiated by John Wilkes and his followers
include: Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050
(K.B. 1765); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
108. See LASSON, supra note 102, at 44-45 (describing the verdicts in the John Wilkes cases,
and noting that the English government's expenses in these cases "were said to total £ 100,000").
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example, in Huckle v. Money," Chief Justice Pratt refused to set
aside a damages verdict won by a printer, whose house had been
searched pursuant to the general warrant. Chief Justice Pratt's
opinion harshly criticized house searches pursuant to general
warrants. For example, Chief Justice Pratt wrote: "To enter a man's
house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence,
is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law with which no
Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring public
attack made upon the liberty of the subject."" Other opinions issued
in the John Wilkes cases included similar criticisms of unlawful house
searches."'
On the other side of the Atlantic, American discussions of
unreasonable searches and seizures also focused on the need to
regulate house searches. In 1761, customs officer Charles Paxton
sought to renew a writ of assistance that Paxton had received from
the Superior Court in Boston."2  The writ of assistance was the
American equivalent of the English general warrant."3 In January
1761, an association of Massachusetts merchants challenged the
lawfulness of Paxton's writ of assistance before the superior court.
James Otis, a prominent Boston attorney, argued the case on behalf
of the merchants.114
Otis argued that the writs of assistance operated as general
warrants, in violation of common law principles. Otis initially
asserted that "the freedom of one's house" was among "the most
essential branches of English liberty."'15 Otis then complained that
with a writ of assistance, customs officials "may enter our houses
109. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
110. Id. at 769.
111. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (C.P. 1765) ("to enter a man's
house, search for and take away all his books and papers" violated common law principles);
Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (C.P. 1763) (where the defendants claimed a right "to
force persons houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, etc. upon a general warrant,"
these actions were "totally subversive [to] the liberty of the subject").
112. Cuddihy, supra note 98, at 760-61.
113. Colonial authorities used the writs of assistance to search for customs violations. The writ
authorized customs officers to search any places where the officers suspected that smuggled
goods were hidden. Customs officers believed that these writs empowered them to enter and
inspect all houses in Massachusetts. See id. at 759.
The writ was named a "writ of assistance" because the writ compelled all peace officers and
other persons present to assist the customs officers in the performance of the search. See Davies,
supra note 97, at 561 n.18.
114. See Cuddihy, supra note 98, at 765.
115. M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978).
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when they please .... may break locks, bars and every thing in their
way - and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no
court can inquire .... ,116
It is significant that Otis argued only against house searches. As
Thomas Davies has noted, Otis's clients were "merchants who also
owned ships and warehouses. '" 7  But Otis did not challenge the
searches of warehouses or the seizure of ships - only physical
intrusions into residences.'18
In discussing unreasonable searches and seizures, early
commentators also focused on house searches. In 1644, Sir Edward
Coke described unreasonable searches in the following terms: "One
or more justice or justices of peace cannot make a warrant upon a
bare surmise to break any man's house to search for a felon, or for
stolen goods .... .9 Coke observed that "for justices of peace to
make warrants upon surmises, for breaking the houses of any subjects
to search for felons, or stolen goods, is against [the] Magna Carta.
120
Early American legal commentators seemed to agree that the
Fourth Amendment merely incorporated the English common law
prohibition on unlawful physical searches of houses. In describing the
Fourth Amendment, Thomas Cooley wrote: "The maxim that 'every
man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in
the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. ' '121  When
Samuel Adams attacked the writs of assistance in 1772, Adams
asserted: "Our homes and even our bedchambers are exposed to be
ransacked, our boxes and chests and trunks broke open and
plundered by wretches... whenever they are pleased to say that they
suspect there are in the house wares etc. for which dutys have not
116. Id.
117. Davies, supra note 97, at 602.
118. Id. at 601-02.
119. EDWARD COKE, FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176
(1817). Coke's treatise originally was published in 1644. See Davies, supra note 97, at 578-79
n.74.
120. COKE, supra note 119, at 176. William Blackstone also emphasized the illegality of
general warrants. Blackstone wrote: "A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected,
without naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for its
uncertainty .. " 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288
(1769) (emphasis in the original).
121. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299-300 (1868).
FALL 20051
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
been paid... ,,122 Adams continued that customs officers "may break
into the sacred rights of domicil, [and] ransack their houses.... ,,
The Continental Congress provides one of the best sources of
information on the intent of the Fourth Amendment's framers. In
their complaint against oppressive British action, the Congress
focused on house searches, and not other law enforcement activity.
As William Cuddihy reports, the Continental Congress, in a 1774
address to the American people, protested against the power of
customs officers "to break open and enter houses without the
authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal information., 124 In a
1774 letter to the inhabitants of Quebec, the Congress warned that
British customs officers would break into "houses, the scenes of
domestic peace and comfort and called the castles of the English
subjects in the books of their law."'"
Framing era sources demonstrated a remarkable uniformity
about what constituted unreasonable searches and seizures. Early
commentators emphasized the need to proscribe unlawful house
searches.
B. Searches Outside of the Home
Without question, framing era discussions of unreasonable
searches and seizures focused on house searches. Nonetheless, the
modern Supreme Court has assumed that the Fourth Amendment
applies to virtually all searches and seizures.126
Did the framers intend that the Fourth Amendment would apply
to searches and seizures, other than house searches? The historical
record suggests that the amendment was not intended to apply
beyond house searches.
First, there is a striking dearth of eighteenth-century and early
122. A State of Rights of the Colonists, in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-
1776, at 243-44 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967) [hereinafter cited as A State of Rights of the Colonists]
(report typically attributed to Samuel Adams).
123. Id. Like James Otis, Adams made his argument in the seaport of Boston. Many members
of Adams' audience undoubtedly were merchants, who owned shops, warehouses, and vessels.
Nonetheless, Adams only discussed house searches.
124. Cuddihy, supra note 98, at 1116.
125. Id. at 1117.
126. See Steinberg, Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, supra note 5, at 228 (the
Supreme Court "has presumed that the Fourth Amendment imposes a global reasonableness
requirement on all searches and seizures"). See also id. at 234-35 (discussing the modem
reasonableness requirement).
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nineteenth-century cases discussing constitutional challenges to
searches and seizures. Prior to the 1886 Supreme Court decision in
Boyd v. United States,127 federal and state constitutional search and
seizure provisions probably were discussed in fewer than 50 court
118opinions. In the rare cases where attorneys argued that law
enforcement activities ran afoul of a federal or a state constitutional
provision, courts typically concluded that the search and seizure
provision had not been violated. 9
With respect to searches and seizures that took place outside of
the home, Americans seemed to assume that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to such controversies. Consider ship seizures. In two
particularly notorious colonial cases, British agents seized ships
owned by prominent merchants Henry Laurens of South Carolina
and John Hancock of Massachusetts. Nelson Lasson observes that




But when the American federal government later seized ships in
the early nineteenth century, the ship seizures were not attacked on
Fourth Amendment grounds. In early nineteenth century ship
seizure cases that reached the United States Supreme Court, the
Fourth Amendment was not even mentioned.1
32
127. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
128. See Davies, supra note 97, at 611-19.
129. See, e.g., Banks v. Farwell, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156, 159-60 (1838) (a warrantless search
of a shop did not violate the Massachusetts constitution, which prohibited unreasonable searches
and seizures); Mayo v. Wilson, I N.H. 53, 59-60 (1817) (a warrantless arrest did not violate the
New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures); Wakely v.
Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814) (a warrantless arrest did not violate the Pennsylvania
constitution, which regulated searches and seizures).
But cf Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 286, 289-90 (1816) (a house search
conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant probably violated a Massachusetts constitutional
provision, which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures).
130. See Cuddihy, supra note 98, at 1205-14.
131. LASSON, supra note 102, at 72. Some authors have cited these ship seizure cases as
indicating that the framers intended to extend the Fourth Amendment beyond house searches. See
Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 962 (1997)
[hereinafter Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment] (the ship seizure controversies
"helped to focus colonial thinking on the principle of probable cause"). But cf Davies, supra
note 97, at 604. Davies contends that the ship seizure controversies did not dispute "general
search authority," but instead involved challenges focused on "'customs racketeering' in the form
of hypertechnical applications of customs rules or forfeiture proceedings based on the perjured
testimony from informers." Id.
132. See, e.g., The Appollon, 22 U.S. 362, 371 (1824) (concluding that a ship seizure was not
authorized by a federal statute, without mentioning the Fourth Amendment); Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. 170, 179 (1804) (same).
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This does not mean that Americans had lost interest in ship
seizures. In the 1789 Collections Act, Congress approved the
warrantless search of vessels for customs violations.'33 Americans
apparently believed that regulation of ship seizures would occur
through federal statutes, and not through application of the Fourth
Amendment.
Finally, advocates of a broad Fourth Amendment note that a few
states sometimes required warrants for non-residential searches and
seizures. For example, a 1786 Rhode Island statute required that
federal tax agents obtain a specific warrant before the agents could
search a "Dwelling-House, Store, Ware-house, or other Building."'3 4
In a 1786 act, Delaware required that government agents obtain
specific warrants before the agents could search buildings for cargo
pilfered from shipwrecked vessels.'35
But in early America, state laws that required a warrant for non-
residential searches clearly were the exception, not the rule. With
respect to searches and seizures in early America, Gerard Bradley
accurately observes: "Warrantless searches, then as now, were the
rule rather than the exception, and each of the thirteen colonies, and
then states, as a common practice, authorized them.', 136 As support
for this proposition, Bradley cites a long list of colonial, state, and





We never will be able to determine the intent of the framers of
the Fourth Amendment with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, the
historical record strongly suggests that the Fourth Amendment was
enacted solely to regulate house searches. The amendment was
enacted to proscribe house searches pursuant to a general warrant, as
133. Collections Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 44-45 (1789). Based on this provision,
Chief Justice William Howard Taft concluded that the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply
to ship searches. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925).
However, if the Framers intended that the Fourth Amendment would govern ship searches, it is
unclear why Congress would pass a statute that simply restated the law imposed by the
amendment. If anything, the Collections Act suggests that Congress needed to enact a law
regulating searches of vessels, because the Fourth Amendment did not apply to such searches.
134. Cuddihy, supra note 98, at 1292.
135. Id. at 1293.
136. Gerard V. Bradley, Present at the Creation? A Critical Guide to Weeks v. United States
and Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1031, 1041 (1986).
137. Id. at 1041-45, nn. 64-65.
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well as warrantless house searches.38 The amendment was not
intended to regulate other types of searches.3 9
138. Thomas Davies has advanced a reading of Fourth Amendment history that is very similar
to the interpretation presented in this article. Davies appropriately emphasizes that the historical
concerns resulting in the Fourth Amendment "were almost exclusively about the need to ban
house searches under general warrants." Davies, supra note 97, at 55 1. See also id at 642-50
(emphasizing the sanctity of the home in eighteenth-century America).
However, I disagree with Davies on at least two points. Davies concludes that the sole purpose
of the Fourth Amendment was "banning Congress from authorizing the use of general warrants."
Id. at 650. "In other words, the Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all in the Fourth
Amendment or in the earlier state provisions." Id. at 55 1.
In concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not address warrantless searches, Davies notes
the absence of eighteenth-century protests about warrantless searches. Id. at 603. However, the
lack of debate about warrantless house searches likely occurred because in early America, "the
common law apparently provided no justification for a search of a house beyond the ministerial
execution of a valid search warrant." Id. at 649. In other words, everyone agreed that warrantless
house searches were impermissible.
According to Davies' reading of the Framers' intent, a search of a house pursuant to a general
warrant would be an "unreasonable search," as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment.
However, Davies asserts that a warrantless house search would not be an unreasonable search, at
least for Fourth Amendment purposes. Given the profound common law tradition that proscribed
unauthorized entries into houses, I cannot agree with Davies' conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment permitted warrantless house searches.
Davies and I also disagree on the implications of the Framers' original intent for current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Davies believes that a return to the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text. Id.
at 741. Davies largely accepts the Supreme Court's rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, because
today law enforcement officers exercise "a level of discretionary authority that the Framers would
not have expected a warrantless officer could exercise unless general warrants had been made
legal." Id.
I agree with Davies' concerns about unrestrained police discretion. However, judicial activism
is not the only potential source for police restraint. As noted in Part V of this article, police
discretion could be limited by police department rule-making, statutory regulations, or damage
awards in civil tort suits. See infra text accompanying notes 158-203.
In short, having nine appointed Supreme Court Justices reinvent the Fourth Amendment based
on their personal views about "unreasonable searches and seizures" is not the most sensible way
to regulate police discretion. In my opinion, Fourth Amendment doctrine is such a mess because
well-intentioned judges have invoked the amendment in situations where it never was intended to
apply. See supra text accompanying notes 7-80 (discussing Fourth Amendment decisions that
seem arbitrary and incoherent).
139. Akhil Amar advocates an interpretation of Fourth Amendment history that is quite
different from the account presented in this article. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth
Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996); Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 4; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1775-81 (1991). Amar's historical argument rests on two
critical propositions. First, like the current Supreme Court, Amar asserts that the framers
intended that the Fourth Amendment would impose a global reasonableness requirement on
almost all government evidence gathering activities. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
supra note 4, at 801-04.
Second, Amar asserts that the framers actually believed all warrants were dangerous -
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IV. The Continuing Importance of the Original Understanding
Why should our Fourth Amendment interpretation be controlled
by the framers' understanding in the eighteenth century? Because no
modern consensus exists about the meaning of the term
"unreasonable searches and seizures." If courts do not rely on the
original intent of the framers, Fourth Amendment decisions will be
purely subjective, based on a particular judge's beliefs about what is
reasonable and unreasonable.
Times certainly have changed since the late eighteenth century,
particularly with respect to law enforcement. In contrast with today's
omnipresent law enforcement departments, crimes and law
enforcement officers were few and far between in early America."o
Unlike members of today's transient society, early Americans
were tied to their residences. Travel was slow, difficult, and often
including specific warrants. Id. at 771-80. According to Amar, the framers did not view the
warrant process as protecting against unreasonable searches. Instead, civil trespass suits offered
the primary protection from such searches. Id. at 774. Amar contends that the Framers viewed
warrants as dangerous, because a warrant would provide "an absolute defense in any subsequent
trespass suit." Id. Amar concludes: "Judges and warrants are the heavies, not the heroes, of our
story." Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1179 (1991). See also
TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEIZURE AND
SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 41 (1967) (also arguing that the Framers
viewed all warrants as "an enemy").
Although Amar's account is creative and engaging, his contentions often seem at odds with the
historical record. To take just one example, when early American legislatures passed statutes
regulating searches and seizures, those statutes sometimes included a warrant requirement. See,
e.g., Excise Act of 1791, 1 Stat. at 207 (1791) (requiring that federal customs officers must obtain
a warrant, before the officers searched certain types of buildings for spirits that were concealed
"with intent to evade the duties thereby imposed upon them"); Davies, supra note 97, at 681-83
(noting that in 1780 and 1785, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted statutes that required specific
warrants for house searches). Although Amar contends that the framers viewed all warrants as
dangerous, these early American statutes requiring warrants contradict Amar's contention.
A number of Fourth Amendment scholars disagree with Amar's reading of Fourth Amendment
history. For articles reviewing and criticizing Amar's historical arguments, see Morgan Cloud,
Searching Through History: Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1739 (1996) (Amar
"selectively deploys incomplete fragments of the historical record to advance a partisan thesis");
Davies, supra note 97, at 663 ("Amar is an engaging writer, but his treatment of text and history
is often loose and uninformed."); Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment, supra note
131, at 929. ("Amar provides an incomplete account of the [Fourth] Amendment's history.").
For a detailed critique of Amar's Fourth Amendment historical analysis, see Steinberg, Akhil
Amar and Fourth Amendment History, supra note 5.
140. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 97, at 620 ("There were no police departments in the
colonies or early states. In fact, there were no professional law enforcement officers."); Sara Sun
Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 40 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCi. 39, 40 (1996) (noting that federal criminal law initially had a very limited
scope, and specified only 17 offenses).
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dangerous.14' An obsession with the sanctity of the home made sense
in early America, when most Americans simply couldn't stray too far
from their residences.
In addition, the types of law enforcement controversies also have
changed. Today, search and seizure controversies sometimes involve
assertions that law enforcement officers regularly discriminate against
racial minorities.4 2  In contrast, early American governments
sometimes used their search and seizure powers to protect slave
holders' ownership over their African-American slaves.'43
Given all of these differences, one might argue that the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment has little relevance today.
Unfortunately, no modern consensus exists about the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment term "unreasonable searches and seizures."
144
Given this lack of consensus, courts cannot develop a coherent
alternative to the original understanding.
Consider perhaps the most familiar modern Fourth Amendment
test - the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. Since the 1967
decision in Katz v. United States,14' the Supreme Court has endorsed
this two-part test for determining when police officers must obtain a
warrant. The Katz test provides: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'146
141. See, e.g., 3 PAGE SMITH, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE YOUNG REPUBLIC: THE SHAPING
OF AMERICA 328 (1980) (noting that in early America, the "slowness and difficulty of travel and
communication" condemned Americans "to a thorough-going provincialism"); Jose L. Fernandez,
Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB.
L. REV. 623, 661 (1998) (in early America, "available land transportation was insignificant or
non-existent, or was too perilous").
142. See David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 279 (1999) (describing a study conducted on the New
Jersey turnpike, which showed "that 73.2 % of those stopped and arrested were black, while only
13.5 % of the cars on the road had a black driver or passenger"); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957-58 (1999)
("Between January 1995 and September 1996, of the 823 citizens detained for drug searches on
one stretch of Interstate 95, over seventy percent were African American."). See also Devon W.
Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1030 (2002) (empirical
evidence suggests that police officers "are more likely to stop blacks and Latinas/os than
whites").
143. As of 1787, five American states preserved the general warrant as a device for capturing
runaway slaves. See Cuddihy, supra note 98, at 1277-82. See also Cloud, supra note 139, at
1727-28.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
145. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
146. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The "reasonable expectation of privacy test" is not
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Supreme Court decisions indicate considerable uncertainty about
when a person has an expectation of privacy "that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."'147  In California v. Greenwood, ' the
Supreme Court considered whether a homeowner possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque, plastic garbage bags,
which the homeowner had left on the front curb for the trash
collector.9 The Greenwood majority concluded that the homeowner
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, with respect to the
contents of the garbage bags. In his majority opinion, Justice Byron
White wrote: "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public."15
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William Brennan disagreed
about whether a homeowner may expect privacy in their curbside
trash bags. Justice Brennan wrote: "Like rifling through desk drawers
or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the
target's financial and professional status, political affiliations and
inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic
interests."''
In California v. Ciraolo," the Justices considered whether a
homeowner possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, with
respect to police surveillance of the homeowner's backyard from an
airborne plane.'53 A majority of the Justices concluded that Dante
Ciraolo did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, with respect
to aerial overflights. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren
Burger asserted: "Any member of the public flying in this airspace
who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
completely ahistorical. The framers were concerned with protected privacy in homes. For
example, in response to the British Townshend Act that authorized writs of assistance, Judge
Willam Henry Drayton of Charleston complained in 1774 that "a petty officer has power to cause
the doors and locks of any man to be broke open, to enter his most private cabinet and thence to
take and carry away, whatever he shall in his pleasure deem uncustomed goods." WILLIAM
HENRY DRAYTON, A Letter From Freeman, in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 15 (R.W. Gibbes ed. 1855) (emphasis added). However, as discussed above, the
framers intended to protect privacy only by preventing unlawful physical trespasses into homes.
See supra text accompanying notes 97 - 139.
147. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
148. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
149. Id. at 37-38.
150. Id. at 40.
151. Id. at 50.
152. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
153. Id. at 209-10.
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observed."15 '
In his dissent, Justice Lewis Powell argued that Ciraolo indeed
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
aerial surveillance by law enforcement officers. Justice Powell
observed: "Travelers on commercial flights, as well as private planes
used for business or personal reasons, normally obtain at most a
fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape
and buildings over which they pass." '55 But in the Ciraolo case,
"police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for the purpose
of discovering evidence of crime within a private enclave into which
they were constitutionally forbidden to intrude at ground level
without a warrant.,
15 6
So who got it right? Do residents possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their curbside trash containers? Do
homeowners possess a reasonable expectation of privacy, with respect
to aerial surveillance of their backyards?
As illustrated by the divisions among the Supreme Court
Justices, there simply are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. Instead, the conclusions will depend on the background
beliefs of the person answering the question - including their beliefs
on the value of the warrant process, the importance of catching and
convicting criminals, the importance of limiting police investigations,
and the proper role of the courts in the law enforcement process. The
divisions in Supreme Court cases such as Greenwood and Ciraolo
demonstrate that a broad consensus on such issues is lacking.
Ultimately, attempts to apply the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test boil down to a judge's subjective assessment about
whether a particular warrantless search seemed appropriate.157 The
arbitrary and unpredictable nature of Fourth Amendment decisions is
not simply the result of sloppy work by Supreme Court Justices.
Given the lack of consensus on basic assumptions regarding police
searches and seizures, vague standards such as the "reasonable
154. Id. at 213.
155. Id. at 223.
156. Id. at 224-25.
157. For criticisms that the Katz test is vague, and subject to result-oriented manipulation, see
Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models in the Age of Technologically
Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647, 665-77 (1988) (criticizing the Katz test as
vague and manipulable); George C. Thomas, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451,
1500 (2005) (agreeing with other scholars that "[tihe 'expectation of privacy' notion is flawed to
the core").
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expectation of privacy" test inevitably will lead to subjective and
arbitrary decisions.
And so we return to the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, which limited the amendment to unlawful house
searches. The original understanding matters, but not because
eighteenth century views on law enforcement are particularly relevant
today. Instead, the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment
is critically important because we lack coherent, principled
alternatives.
V. Police Restraint in a World Without a Fourth Amendment
Assume that the Supreme Court returned to the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and applied the
amendment only to house searches. In such a regime, cases involving
the amendment rarely would arise. Other means of restraining police
discretion would deserve attention.
If the scope of the Fourth Amendment were more limited, at
least three other approaches for restraining police discretion would
be plausible. Those alternative sources include internal police
department rule-making, statutory regulations, and civil damage suits
based on the tort of trespass.
A. Police Department Rule-Making
In a landmark 1974 article, Anthony Amsterdam recommended
that police departments promulgate regulations, which would limit
police discretion with respect to searches and seizures. Amsterdam
asserted that police rule-making would "tend to tame the welter of
police practices that now come before the courts for fourth
amendment adjudication by preventing some of those practices from
being used in the first place."'59
In the abstract, Amsterdam's proposal has won wide-ranging
support and praise. The United States Supreme Court has written
that police department rules "governing the conduct of criminal
investigations are generally considered desirable," and that such rules
"may well provide more valuable protection to the public at large
than the deterrence flowing from the occasional exclusion of items of
158. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MNN. L. REV. 349,
416-17 (1974).
159. Id. at 421.
[Vol. 33:1
evidence in criminal trials." ' 6° A broad array of scholars also have
praised Amsterdam's proposal.'
Yet despite the almost universal praise, actual implementation of
Amsterdam's police rulemaking proposal largely has not taken place.
As David Sklanksy writes: "Progress toward guidelines for the
exercise of police discretion has been sporadic, crisis-driven, and
limited. 
,162
The lack of police department rule-making probably results from
many factors. But police departments may have declined to develop
search and seizure rules because courts already occupy the field. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as a license for writing detailed codes that regulate
police conduct." With courts having undertaken the task of
regulating searches and seizures, police departments may see little
reason to get involved.
In fact, under the current regime, police departments have
considerable incentives not to undertake rulemaking. As noted
above, Fourth Amendment doctrine is complicated, unpredictable,
and pervasive.' A police department easily could write a rule, which
a court ultimately would determine had violated the Fourth
Amendment. After a court identified the error, the police
department would face considerable embarrassment and almost
certain liability. In the current regime, police departments have every
reason not to get involved.
If the Supreme Court limited the Fourth Amendment to house
160. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979).
161. See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 658-59 (1997) (advocating
"broad policy statements developed within the police department that seek to instruct the officer
in how to employ his discretion in addressing specific public order problems"); Erik Luna,
Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1142-43 (2000) ("The last few years have seen a
revived academic interest in controlling discretion within the criminal justice system, with
particular emphasis placed on the visibility and accountability of discretionary judgments.").
162. David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affinnative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88
VA. L. REv. 1229, 1273 (2002). See also id. at 1274-75 (explaining that lower courts have
written that whether to require police department rule-making is a matter for the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court "has shown no interest in requiring it"); Samuel Walker, Controlling the
Cops: A Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 361, 368 (1986)
(describing how police manuals typically "overemphasize trivial matters of internal discipline,"
while ignoring "most of the critical issues related to the exercise of police authority").
163. See supra text accompanying notes 7-80. See also Steinberg, Akhil Amar and Fourth
Amendment History, supra note 5, at 234 (stating that the Supreme Court has assumed that the
Fourth Amendment applies to almost all searches and seizures).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 7-80.
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searches, would police rule-making fill the void? Police critics no
doubt would express skepticism. In support of warrants, the Supreme
Court has contrasted the neutral magistrate considering a warrant
application with police officers "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."'65  This statement implies that
police officers are concerned only with the end result of catching
criminals, and not with the intrusiveness of their investigations.
Such statements carry unnecessarily cynical implications. Police
officers typically live in the neighborhoods that they police. Like any
other citizens, police officers value security and privacy for
themselves and their families. If the Supreme Court returned to the
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, police
departments would have a real incentive to regulate the conduct of
their officers. If police departments did not implement the necessary
regulations, citizens could turn to the elected officials who regulated
those officers.
B. Statutory Regulations
Statutes adopted by elected legislators provide another possible
source of police restraint. As was the case for police departments, the
Supreme Court's development of detailed Fourth Amendment police
codes leaves legislatures with little incentive to regulate searches and
seizures. Any police regulations proposed by a legislature would face
criticism as either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. 66 It is
easier simply to do nothing.
Nonetheless, legislatures sometimes have proven quite willing to
impose restrictions on law enforcement officers, when particular
search techniques generated real public concern. In the 1967 United
States v. Katz167 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that a
warrantless wiretap violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." But for practical purposes, the most important
restrictions on wiretapping appear in a federal statute enacted by
Congress - Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 ("Title III").169 Title III requires that the government
165. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
166. See Livingston, supra note 161, at 662 ("Politicians, afraid of being viewed as 'anti-
police,' may be reluctant to require that police promulgate guidelines for the enforcement of
public order laws."); Walker, supra note 162, at 385 ("Legislative bodies have been particularly
reluctant to become involved in the details of police operations.").
167. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
168. Id. at 349-59.
169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
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must obtain a court order prior to installing a wiretap9 Title III
specifies the requirements for a wiretap application,17' and the
standards that a judge must use in determining whether to grant the
application.72 Title III makes unauthorized wiretapping a felony.73
To date, the significant restrictions on the interception of
internet communications have derived from federal statutes, rather
than from the Fourth Amendment. With respect to internet
transmissions, the most applicable statute probably is the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).17' Among other
things, the ECPA governs the use of a "trap and trace" device - a
device which "captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number of an instrument or device
from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted."'75
Like the Title III restriction on wiretaps, the ECPA permits the use
of a trap and trace device only after the government has obtained a
court order.76 The ECPA specifies the contents of an application for
a trap and trace device,77 and the circumstances where a court should
permit the use of such a device.178  Accordingly, in cases where
citizens feel the most profound concerns about intrusive searches,
Congress has passed statutes that constrain police activity.
Regulation of police searches by statutes is an attractive
alternative, when compared to regulation of such searches by the
Supreme Court. If a statutory regulation does not work well in
practice, it is easy to amend or repeal the statute. Reversing a
problematic Supreme Court interpretation typically involves a much
slower and more uncertain process.
Further, statutory regulations permit a much more flexible
approach with respect to remedies for violations. Exclusion of
evidence from a criminal trial might occur only after the most
egregious police violations, if at all. Other remedies could include
170. Id. § 2516(3).
171. Id. § 2518(1).
172. Id. § 2518(3).
173. Id. §2511.
174. Id. §§ 3121-3127.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2000).
176. Id. § 3121(a).
177. Id. § 3122(b)(2).
178. Id. 3123(b)(1). But cf Christian David Hammel Schultz, Note, Unrestricted Federal
Agent: "Carnivore" and the Need to Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1215, 1242-54 (2001) (asserting that existing federal statutes do not apply to the "Carnivore"
program, which tracks a user's internet activity).
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fines, money compensation for victims of unlawful searches, or
employment citations that could effect a police officer's salary or
chances of promotion."' In short, statutory regulation suggests
greater substantive and remedial flexibility than the current Fourth
Amendment regime.
C. Tort Suits And Civil Damages
The origins of the prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures developed in civil trespass suits. As noted above, in the
influential John Wilkes cases from 1763 to 1769, English courts
imposed trespass liability on the British government for house
searches conducted pursuant to an invalid general warrant.'8
According to Nelson Lasson, the English government's expenses in
the John Wilkes cases totaled 100,000 pounds.
8'
Today, plaintiffs do not often sue police officers for damages in
trespass actions. The dearth of such tort suits has occurred for many
reasons. Attorneys tend to think of intrusive police searches and
seizures as Fourth Amendment violations, rather than as common law
trespass suits. As a result, damage actions arising out of unlawful
searches and/or seizures typically are brought as Fourth Amendment
suits, rather than under the tort doctrine of trespass.'8 A prevailing
plaintiff may shift their attorney's fees to the defendant in a Fourth
Amendment suit, but not in a trespass tort suit.'83 State statutes
sometimes immunize law enforcement officers from tort liability.'
179. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REv. 363, 405-406 (1999) (advocating a civil damages alternative to the exclusionary rule,
which could include monetary liability for police officers, class actions, and injunctive relief).
180. The published opinions that arose out of suits initiated by John Wilkes and his followers
include: Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050
(K.B. 1765); Entick Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763). For a further discussion of the John Wilkes cases, see supra text
accompanying notes 103-11.
181. LASSON, supra note 102, at 44-45.
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (imposing liability on any person who causes a citizen of the
United States to be deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution").
183. See id. § 1988 (in a §1983 damages suit, a court "may allow the prevailing party" to
recover "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs").
184. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-338 (1975) (any peace officer "shall have immunity from tort
liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the
line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2) (a
police officer is "immune from tort liability," unless the officer's conduct amounts to gross
negligence); Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471-72 (Ind. 2003) (an Indiana statute bars
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And when the state has brought criminal charges against an
individual, a defense attorney may be more focused on excluding
evidence at a criminal trial, as opposed to seeking damages in a civil
suit.
Nonetheless, a few trespass suits against police officers still
occur. In Montes v. Gallegos,"' Police Chief Danny Pacheco entered
the home of Juan Montes and Marian Montes. Pacheco then arrested
Juan Montes.8 6 The trial court ultimately concluded that Pacheco's
entry and arrest were based on a facially invalid warrant."
Maria Montes brought a trespass action against Pacheco."s In
ruling on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, District Judge
James A. Parker wrote that Chief Pacheco had engaged in "an
unauthorized entry upon the land of another."'8 9 As a result, Judge
Parker granted Montes' motion for summary judgment on her
trespass action.
In Yeager v. Hurt,9' Sheriff H.F. Yeager of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety seized plaintiff James Hurt's
motorcycle.'9 Yeager incorrectly believed that the motorcycle was
stolen. 93 Although the motorcycle was not stolen, the Alabama
Department of Public Safety retained possession of the motorcycle
for more than two years.'94 While in the department's custody, this
vehicle was damaged.'95
A jury awarded Hurt $20,000 damages, based on a Fourth
tort suits against any government employee, where the defendant acted within the scope of their
employment).
In a damages suit alleging a Fourth Amendment violation, a law enforcement defendant may
defeat the suit by establishing qualified immunity. A law enforcement officer will succeed on a
qualified immunity argument, unless a reasonable officer would have understood that their
conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (an executive branch officer or employee
sued for a constitutional violation may establish qualified immunity, unless the officer or
employee has violated "clearly established law").
185. Montes v. Gallegos, 812 F. Supp. 1165 (D.N.M. 1992).
186. Id. at 1169.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1170.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Yeager v. Hurt, 433 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1983).
192. Id. at 1179.
193. Id. at 1178-79.
194. Id. at 1182.
195. Id.
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Amendment claim that Sheriff Yeager had engaged in an
unreasonable search and seizure with respect to Hurt's motorcycle.1
96
However, the jury also awarded Hurt an additional $2,000 damages
on a variety of state tort claims, including a trespass action.' 97 The
Alabama Supreme Court ultimately upheld the damage awards
entered against Sheriff Yeager.' 9s
If police searches and seizures were regulated primarily by
trespass law, this court-created body of law might develop the same
unpredictability and arbitrary results as current Fourth Amendment
law. However, state legislators could correct any particularly
troublesome trespass ruling.'9 Such input from elected officials is not
possible in Fourth Amendment cases, where the United States
Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations are the supreme law
of the land.
A tort damages remedy also might serve deterrence and fairness
goals more effectively than the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
Whether the exclusion of evidence actually deters police misconduct
is uncertain.2m The prospect of police officers or police departments
facing money judgments would provide a clear incentive to avoid
improper searches and seizures.
In addition, trespass judgments would not affect results at
criminal trials. A trespass judgment simply would require that a law
enforcement officer must pay money damages. Conversely, where a
court finds a Fourth Amendment violation, highly probative physical
evidence typically is excluded from a criminal trial."'
196. Id. at 1179.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1179-82. See also Brooks v. Harrisburg, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 1, 2-4 (1979) (refusing
to dismiss a trespass action, where police officers allegedly entered the plaintiffs' house and
arrested an innocent man).
199. In addition, each state develops its own body of trespass law. A quirky trespass
interpretation would affect only one state, and could be repudiated by other jurisdictions.
Conversely, Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment bind the entire United
States.
200. For an introduction to the debate on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule, compare
Slobogin, supra note 179, at 378-94 (questioning whether the exclusionary rule will deter abuses
of police power), with Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 820, 851 (1994) ("Like it or not, the exclusionary rule, with all of its limitations, is in very
real terms 'the only game in town."').
201. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) ("[T]he occasional suppression of
illegally obtained yet probative evidence has long been considered a necessary cost of preserving
overriding constitutional values."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (the
exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-60 (1961) (the exclusionary rule applies to the
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A search and seizure regime based on trespass law would not be
problem free. Damage suits against police officers may face a
number of obstacles, including the reluctance of attorneys to sue the
law enforcement officers who protect them.02 Nonetheless, regulating
searches and seizures through trespass actions, together with police
department rules and statutory regulations, present a viable
alternative to arbitrary and unpredictable regulation of law
enforcement officers through the Fourth Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
The framers of the Constitution never intended that the Fourth
Amendment would govern all police investigations. Instead, the
framers intended that the Fourth Amendment only would prohibit
unlawful physical searches of houses, pursuant to a general warrant,
or no warrant at all. And outside of the need to regulate such house
searches, no modern consensus has emerged on the appropriate
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment decisions appear arbitrary and subjective
because these decisions are arbitrary and subjective. Police officers
acting in good faith violate the Fourth Amendment, because the
officers cannot understand Fourth Amendment law. Evidence is then
excluded and as a result, guilty criminals go free.
states, and the trial court should have excluded obscene material obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
202. Some of the problems that might accompany a reliance on damage suits to deter improper
searches and seizures include: 1) A victim may be unaware that they possess a civil action; 2)
Even if the victim is aware of their right to sue for damages, the victim may fear police reprisals
and decline to bring suit; 3) The victim may be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute the
action; 4) Police officers may be able to defeat the action by asserting a good faith belief in the
legality of their actions as a defense; 5) Police officers are likely to appear as more credible
witnesses before a trier of fact than a victim of an improper search, particularly if this victim can
be linked to criminal activity; and 6) The victim of an improper search may be unable to prove
that they suffered any compensable damages as a result of an improper search. See William A.
Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1386-90 (1981). See also Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 360 (asserting that
Fourth Amendment civil actions are "seldom maintained, nor are they, as a practical matter,
maintainable").
203. A number of commentators have advocated civil damage suits as an alternative to the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 4, at 811-16
(suggesting a variety of civil enforcement alternatives to the exclusionary rule, including civil
damage suits); Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 969-90 (1983) (proposing
restitution to victims of police injustice as a preferable alternative to the exclusionary rule);
Slobogin, supra note 179, at 405-23 (arguing that the exclusionary rule should be replaced by a
hybrid damages system, based on both tort law and administrative law).
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The final section of this article contains alternatives to the
current regime, where the Supreme Court has used the Fourth
Amendment to develop police codes that govern searches and
seizures. Such alternatives include police department rule-making,
statutory regulations, and tort suits seeking civil damages. Each of
these alternatives has advantages and disadvantages.
Regardless of the viability of the proposed alternatives, the
Court should reconsider its current approach to the Fourth
Amendment. Fourth Amendment doctrine is such a mess because
judges are attempting to apply the amendment in situations where it
was never intended to apply.
